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POST - Unit 4, Section 1, Activity 5

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POST - Unit 4, Section 1, Activity 5

Started by Duncan Robertson July 24, 2023 - 8:26pm

Discuss the following question in the discussion forum: Can you construct a real-world example (different from the examples in the textbook) where the individual preference lists for three alternatives are as in the voting paradox of Condorcet?

The following is a case where a candidate wins the plurality vote but another candidate wins the Condorcet condition

 

a ≻ b ≻ c

a ≻ b ≻ c

a ≻ b ≻ c

b ≻ c ≻ a

b ≻ c ≻ a

c ≻ b ≻ a

c ≻ b ≻ a

 

Plurality:

a wins  3 over 2, 2

 

Condorcet:

b and c are both preferred over a by 4 to 3

b is preferred over c by 4 to 3

therefore b wins by Condorcet.

COMP667  Multiagent Systems

COMP667 Multiagent Systems

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